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Ar by both magstripe and EMV chip readers, mapping it from peripheral all the way through the electronic payments infrastructure. Common attack vectors will then be presented, building on that architectural knowledge. Finally, top attack mitigations will be provided to save businesses from being breached and the disastrous losses that result. Malware is widely acknowledged as a growing threat with hundreds of thousands of new samples reported each week. Zte axon 7 cheap Analysis of these malware samples has to deal with this significant quantity but also with the defensive capabilities built into malware. Malware authors use a range of evasion techniques to harden their creations against accurate analysis. The evasion techniques aim to disrupt attempts of disassembly, debugging or analyze in a virtualized environment.

Two years ago, in 2011, we presented (with other researchers) at Black Hat USA a wide range of anti-reverse engineering techniques that malware were currently employing. For each technique, we documented how it works, we created an algorithm to detect its usage, and we provided statistics on the technique prevalence in a 4 million samples database.

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We also provided a fully-working PoC implementing each of the techniques (either in C or Assembly). Our expectation was that the AV industry would use our ideas (proven with the prevalence numbers) to significantly improve the malware prevention coverage.

In this talk, we are going to give another try and demonstrate the prevalence of more than 50 non-defensive additional characteristics found in modern malware. Additionally to that, we also extended our previous research demonstrating what the malware does once it detects it is being analyzed.

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The underlying malware sample database has an open architecture that allows researchers not only to see the results of the analysis, but also to develop and plug-in new analysis capabilities. At the network layer, encrypted tunnels are typically seen as black boxes. Network traffic however, leaks side channel information that can often be analyzed to determine what the tunnel is being used for and the type of content being sent over it. Probabilistic algorithms will be explored that can analyze this side channel information and identify application protocols within the tunnel.

Recent revelations of the NSA ANT program illustrated the many well-known and low-cost physical and firmware attacks that can compromise data in-use and system integrity. This talk will review several such attacks, including SMM bootkits, "cold booting," and malicious devices.

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We will also discuss how upcoming technologies such as Software Guard Extensions (SGX), Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID), and TPM 2. Every day, millions of people go through airport security. While it is an inconvenience that could take a while, most are willing to follow the necessary procedures if it can guarantee their safety.

Modern airport security checkpoints use sophisticated technology to help the security screeners identify potential threats and suspicious baggage. Have you ever wondered how these devices work? Have you ever wondered why an airport security checkpoint was set up in a particular configuration?

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Join us as we present the details on how a variety of airport security systems actually work, and reveal their weaknesses. In this talk, we will show cutting edge research and a tool built to accurately detect vulnerabilities.

The tool leverages the standard program execution to detect the full dataflow of vulnerabilities at runtime. It can be used both offensively and defensively.

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We will show how RAVAGE can be used to detect vulnerabilities, generate exploits, and integrate the newly found exploits into existing exploitation frameworks. In addition to the offensive usage, it can also be used defensively by running existing non-security-related test cases to detect security vulnerabilities.

We will open source RAVAGE as well as design documentation at Black Hat. TrustZone has emerged as a leading option for security-critical tasks on ARM devices. As a result, TrustZone is used on millions of mobile devices for diverse tasks including managing secure boot, storing DRM keys on behalf of digital content providers, supporting mobile payments, and performing integrity validation on the live operating system kernel.

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After providing a review of prior work in TrustZone exploitation, this talk will describe a previously unpublished vulnerability in this TrustZone implementation, and provide details on steps taken to exploit this vulnerability. The talk will conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of this vulnerability and others like it, including a live demonstration of using it to permanently unlock the bootloader of a major Android phone. Unfortunately, the diversity and sheer number of devices in the ecosystem represent a significant challenge to security researchers.

Primarily, auditing and exploit development efforts are less effective when focusing on a single device because each device is like a snowflake: unique. By examining and testing against multiple devices, you can discover similarities and differences between devices or families of devices.

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Such a cluster also enables quickly testing research findings or extracting specific information from each device. When you leave this presentation, you will understand why the diversity problem exists and how to tackle it by creating a cluster of your own. Joshua will show you how to build such a cluster, provide a set of tools to manage one, and show you all the ways to leverage it to be more successful in your auditing and exploit development tasks. Some vendors intentionally obfuscate JTAG points or remove them to prevent reverse engineering.

In this talk, we look closely at the process of reverse engineering embedded devices by interacting directly with Flash memory. We also look at reprogramming chips and putting them back on the board. The fun with this method is that you can access the underlying out-of-band data that contains page and block information.

As Flash memory is a fragile media, bad blocks or page data contamination are common problems. Whenever you extract data from memory, you should be able to take care of this meta information.

When you write back the data, you need to recalculate sums and set the correct flags on these areas. Embedded systems that interact directly with Flash memory usually use journaling file systems to avoid repeating write operations on specific pages. The journaling file system is interesting as it contains the entire history of file operations. You can just mount the file system directly from your Linux box or you can write a simple parser to check the history of the file system operations.

This feature might give reverse engineers a good view of how Flash memory is programmed and used. This presentation walks through the reverse engineering and exploitation of a hardened embedded device and provides certain techniques you can use to exploit similar devices. The Supra iBox BT is a bluetooth and IR-based physical key storage device used by many real estate professionals in the US. It is physically hardened, and inside is a hardened MSP430 with a blown JTAG fuse. As MSP430 devices become more common, it is slowly becoming the norm to encounter devices in production with blown JTAG fuses. Previously, this was a significant hurdle.

This presentation will review those attacks and describe the challenges facing a researcher attempting to perform them. This presentation will demonstrate how to reliably perform successful firmware extraction on a MSP430 with a blown JTAG fuse. The second part of the presentation covers what I found inside the Supra iBox firmware, including a demonstration of an exploit that can open any iBox. The presentation will describe the complex and surprisingly effective crypto key management scheme used by Supra. The Supra lock has no internet access, and must rely on the keys (generally smartphones)